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GOOD INTENTIONS MATTER
Katharine T. Bartlett*

W

HILE writing the article to which Professors Mitchell and Bielby have published responses,1 I was mindful of the many ways
in which the article could be misinterpreted. In taking issue with the assumption that legal controls work in a direct, linear manner to deter
crimination, I thought I might be misunderstood to say that people are
not responsive to incentives. In worrying about how legal sanctions exert external pressure that may crowd out the inclination of wellintentioned people to self-monitor for bias, I feared that the article would
be read mistakenly to oppose strong and appropriate legal rules against
discrimination. In arguing that we should take people’s good intentions
not to discriminate as a useful starting point for better workplace policies, rather than as the cynical exhibition of people’s self-delusion, I anticipated that the article would be dismissed as a fanciful and naïve denial of the existence of race and gender bias. In arguing that wellintentioned people can overcome their natural tendencies to discriminate, I was concerned about appearing to claim that good intentions are
sufficient to end discrimination.
* A. Kenneth Pye Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
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In the case of the responses by Professor Mitchell and Professor Bielby, these fears were unwarranted. The responses engage the article’s actual objectives—to clarify the state of empirical knowledge about unconscious workplace bias and to evaluate proposed approaches to
reducing it. Professors Mitchell and Bielby, both leading figures in research about workplace bias, bring their considerable expertise to bear
on evaluating and expanding the themes of the article. They each agree
that legal scholars have ignored some of the relevant psychological literature and interpreted the research on which they have drawn in a shallow way. They also correctly identify my concerns about the overuse of
legal coercion to reduce workplace bias, and concur that more legal controls are not likely be effective in reducing implicit bias.
Beyond these areas of agreement, there are differences in emphasis
and enthusiasm. Professor Mitchell warns against too much reliance on
research findings that are based on the responses of people (typically
college students) to hypothetical situations. Professor Mitchell is wellknown for his cautions against the application of experimental research
findings to real-world settings. Some of his work criticizes social psychologists and legal scholars for exaggerating the prevalence of implicit
bias.2 He does not direct this criticism against me here, perhaps because
I make no claim about the frequency with which implicit bias occurs and
nothing in my article turns on its exact magnitude.3 He does draw further
attention to the need for better field research and offers one helpful explanation for why it is so hard to get: managers in a position to adopt
testable workplace practices are reluctant to adopt these practices in the
absence of good evidence that they might actually work.4 No one could
dispute the need for further applied research. Fortunately, as Professor
Mitchell notes, some scholars are busy at it.5
While noting the dangers of overreading the laboratory research on
which the article cautiously relies, Professor Mitchell proposes a
―scal[ing] up‖ of the article’s thesis from company managers to the
2

Mitchell, supra note 1, at 112 n.6. For Mitchell’s extensive views on the limits of existing
research on implicit bias, see Gregory Mitchell, Second Thoughts, 40 McGeorge L. Rev. 687
(2009), and work cited at Mitchell, supra note 1, at 112 n.6.
3
And, perhaps, because Mitchell already has written extensively on this point. See Mitchell, Second Thoughts, supra note 2.
4
Mitchell, supra note 1, at 113–14.
5
Id. at 113–15. For examples, see Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing
Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 Harv. J.L. & Gender 247 (2006), and sources
cited in Mitchell, supra note 1, at 113 n.8.
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company itself.6 At the firm level, he observes, the legal system sometimes discourages companies from adopting workplace practices that
might ameliorate bias. His example is a well-intentioned firm that undertakes in-house audits and organizational culture reviews to determine
which of its workplace structures might obscure or enable workplace bias, only to have these materials used against the company in subsequent
adversarial litigation.7 Whether and to what extent a firm would be penalized by such audits and reviews depends in part, even under existing
law, on the way the company responds to them.8 The example, though,
is a useful one, in showing that companies, as well as individuals, can
have good intentions that might be thwarted by policies that are too eager to find fault and impose liability.9
Professor Bielby’s principal response to the article is that it focuses
on the cognitive aspects of discrimination rather than the structural
forces that support it. While Professor Bielby agrees that more law to
combat implicit bias is a ―bad idea,‖10 he believes that the case I have
made for more attention to the motivational consequences of workplace
diversity measures is wrongly grounded in the psychological processes
of implicit bias rather than in the ―organizational policies, practices, and
structures that create and sustain unlawful racial and gender inequality at
work.‖11
Professor Bielby is correct that the focus of the article is on the psychology of discrimination. The article’s purpose is to respond to legal
scholars who assume that bias is a pervasive psychological phenomenon
to which the solution is stronger legal controls. The article provides a
fuller account of the psychology of bias by differentiating between the
motivations that might lead people to avoid it. It demonstrates that
measures that motivate people internally are more effective in reducing
bias than external constraints, and that the law, insofar as it functions as
an external constraint that may crowd out people’s internal motivation to
be unbiased, may actually exacerbate bias rather than reduce it. The article does not ignore the role of workplace structures. In fact, it endorses
6

Mitchell, supra note 1, at 114.
Id. at 115.
8
Id. at 115 n.11.
9
Apart from its negative impact on a company’s positive internal identity, it should be
noted that the policy may be defective, as well, on the basis of the negative external incentives it produces.
10
Bielby, supra note 1, at 117.
11
Id. at 119.
7
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various structural measures that work to strengthen people’s internal
motivation to act in unbiased ways, including collaborative structures
that facilitate positive intergroup interactions, job rotation systems, upper management role models who demonstrate a genuine commitment to
diversity, and accountability systems that further participation and a
sense of ownership by those involved.
Professor Bielby’s criticism is that, in making the case for these and
other measures, I remain too focused on what goes on in people’s heads,
rather than on what they do. Susan Sturm, in conversations with me, has
made a similar observation. I take the point—to a point. Our shared objective is the reduction of bias, not moral salvation; people’s good intentions are valuable as a means of reducing bias, but is not itself the goal.
The same thing can be said, however, about workplace structures; they
are a means to an end, not the end itself. Both good intentions and
workplace structures that promote unbiased decision-making are important, independently and in interaction with one another. As the research
in the article suggests, attitudes and beliefs affect the impact that various
workplace structures might have, and vice versa. I accept Professor Bielby’s point that discrimination operates in institutions. I hope he will
accept mine that discrimination operates in people’s minds as well. Both
matter.
Professor Bielby notes the vagueness of the line I draw between organizational strategies that people find coercive and threatening and those
that promote people’s intrinsic commitment to nondiscrimination.12 I
concede that ascertaining whether a particular policy will promote or
discourage the internalization of desired nondiscrimination norms requires judgment and finesse, to which knowledge of the basic principles
of human motivation and the dynamics within a particular work force
are both highly relevant. Professor Bielby notes that management plays
a role in constructing the message as positive or negative. 13 Indeed. That
is the point. Good leadership knows its people and figures out how best
to communicate with them, aware that the internal constraints it stimulates can have an even more favorable effect in how they behave than
the external constraints it imposes.
What happens when the organizations do not get it, or fail to transmit
positive, nondiscriminatory values throughout the workforce? Professor
12
13

Id. at 123.
Id.
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Bielby notes that it is ―risky‖ to rely on ―nondiscrimination efforts that
require internally motivated well-intentioned acts in order to be effective.‖14 I could not agree more, which is why Title VII remains an essential piece of an integrated nondiscrimination policy. Title VII is the legal
backstop—a necessary tool, especially for workplaces that are not wellintentioned and well-run, and do not have the institutional commitment
or structures to prevent discrimination. Title VII does a reasonably good
job of defining what the law can define. But Title VII, no matter how
well it is drafted, cannot do the job itself. No law can identify or apprehend all instances of discrimination, which is why it is so important to
engage people’s positive attitudes as well as their fear of legal sanctions.
Mitchell and Bielby are right to emphasize, in their different ways,
the importance of workplace structures and institutions. Positive norms
and good intentions alone will not do the trick. In my defense, however,
the article does not claim that they will. To the extent that Professors
Mitchell and Bielby understand the article to say that good intentions are
enough,15 they misread the piece. The choice is not between internal
norms or external structures. It is, rather, between continuing to focus on
laws and workplace structures as the only meaningful constraints on discrimination, or figuring out how to trigger the internal constraints that
might bear some of the load.

14
15

Id. at 124.
Both titles imply this reading, although the responses themselves do not.

